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TEEcorrelate

An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs

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- Mitigation by AMD: **Disable performance counters**

Defense: TEEcorrelate

- Defends against fine-grained PC leakage

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- 2 main components:

Temporal Decorrelation



(a) Native Events



(b) Temporal decorrelated events

Value Decorrelation



Value Decorrelation



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- Estimated runtime overhead: $\approx 0.09\%$

Conclusion

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